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John R. Weisz
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Accurate judgments about personal control depend in part on accurate judgments
about the contingency of outcomes because noncontingent outcomes are inher-
ently uncontrollable. Yet children often fail to recognize noncontingency when
they see it. In a developmental study of such failures, children's contingency
judgments were assessed following their participation in chance activities at a
state fair. Younger children (aged 6-10 years) regarded the outcomes of these
activities as controllable—that is, most of them saw the outcomes of their own
performance as caused by skill-related factors and regarded such factors (age,
intelligence, effort, and practice) as significantly influencing the outcomes of
other children's performance. Older children (aged 11-14 years), by contrast,
generally identified the outcomes of their own performance as caused by luck,
and they minimized the role of skill-related factors in the performance outcomes
of others. Yet even the older children regarded such factors as somewhat relevant
to outcomes they predicted for others. This was true even of children at formal
operational age levels and of children who explicitly identified outcomes as caused
by "luck." Moreover, children at both age levels showed evidence of self-serving
bias: Those who had won prizes they wanted saw outcomes as strongly affected
by effort, but those who had failed to win did not. The findings support Piaget's
views on the pervasiveness of perceived contingency in young children. Consistent
with adult literature, however, the findings suggest that neither the attainment
of formal operations nor the recognition that luck causes outcomes ensures ac-
curate judgments about control.
In theory and research on the psychology
of control, perceived contingency plays a
central role (see, e.g., Abramson, Seligman,
& Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975; Weisz,
1979). For an individual to exercise control
over an outcome, two conditions must exist.
First, the outcome must be contingent on
variations in the behavior of persons similar
to that individual; a noncontingent outcome
is inherently uncontrollable. Second, the in-
dividual must have sufficient competence to
capitalize on the contingency that exists—
that is, he or she must be able to produce
the behavior on which the desired outcome
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is contingent. (For further details, see Weisz
& Stipek, in press.) Mistaken perceptions
of contingency can lead to futile attempts
to influence noncontingent outcomes (see
Langer, 1975), inappropriate losses in self-
esteem following uncontrollable failure (cf.
Abramson et al., 1978), and even the blam-
ing of innocent victims for adverse noncon-
tingent outcomes (see Lerner, 1977).
Literature from the Piagetian tradition
suggests that erroneous perceptions of con-
tingency are to some extent a function of
developmental level. In Piaget and Inhelder's
(1975) developmental analysis of chance
concepts, for example, they argue that chil-
dren understand the noncontingency of ran-
dom events only as they develop a grasp of
reversible operations. The outcome of a
throw of the dice, for example, is not logi-
cally reversible. Its fortuitous nature can
only be understood when it is contrasted with
outcomes that can be reversed by inverting
a causal sequence. That sort of contrast,
however, only begins to make sense during
the concrete operations period (elementary
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school age levels) and is not fully understood
until formal operations (adolescence).
Early in development, according to the
Piagetian perspective, children reason intu-
itively; they often infer contingency on the
basis of mere contiguity of events (for data,
see Siegler & Liebert, 1974). Lacking log-
ical operations, the children have no inter-
nalized standard representing truly contin-
gent relations against which to test new
experience. One result of this is that some
events that occur by chance, both in games
and in nature, are perceived as contingent
on potentially identifiable causes. Piaget and
Inhelder (1975) saw evidence of such a per-
ception in many of the "why" questions with
which young children so often frustrate their
parents. Questions such as "Why isn't there
a spring in our garden?" or "Why are you
so tall and yet have small ears?" are said to
reveal an assumption that identifiable con-
tingencies exist for what are actually chance
events in nature. Piaget and Inhelder did not
give examples drawn from games of chance,
but they would presumably interpret young
children's questions about why dice fall into
a certain pattern or how a younger child can
draw winning cards more often than an older
child can (both observed in my own re-
search) as reflecting similar contingency as-
sumptions.
Other examples of erroneous perceived
contingency are given in Piaget's (1930)
studies of causal reasoning per se. In one
example, a child maintains that "the moon
gets bigger because we are growing bigger"
(p. 304). Unlike adults, who might say this
analogically, the young child, according to
Piaget, "means that we actually make the
moon grow bigger" (p. 304). Piaget does not
give an exhaustive explanation of such er-
rors. They seem likely, however, to be stim-
ulated partly by a limited understanding of
the natural world and partly by difficulties
in comprehending the relation between cause
and effect (for related evidence in the
achievement domain, see Nicholls, 1978).
Whatever their causes, the kinds of illusory
contingency described in the causality lit-
erature (e.g., Piaget, 1930, 1976), like those
described in the literature on chance (Piaget
& Inhelder, 1975), are depicted as declining
during development and as largely disap-
pearing with the appearance of formal op-
erational thought.
A third body of Piagetian evidence may
be relevant to the study of perceived contin-
gency—that is, the literature on "immanent
justice." Early Piagetian research (e.g., Pia-
get, 1932) identified a tendency in young
children to perceive noncontingent adverse
events as contingent on people's misbehav-
ior. For example, when told a story about
a bridge that collapsed under a child who
had stolen something, young children often
construed that collapse as punishment con-
tingent on the misbehavior. Older children
and adolescents, by contrast, were more
likely to find plausible naturalistic expla-
nations for adverse events, explanations not
invoking contingency between the adverse
event and the human behavior.
Thus Piagetian literature on the chance
concept, on causal reasoning, and on im-
manent justice seems to point to develop-
mental declines in various forms of illusory
contingency. The actual data offered by Pia-
get, though, are often limited and largely
anecdotal. This is certainly true of Piaget
and Inhelder's (1975) analysis of the
"chance" concept. Most of their research
deals only with notions of randomness and
rules of probability; their speculations that
young children perceive chance events as
contingent are supported almost exclusively
by selected examples. Piaget's discussions of
causal reasoning have been criticized (e.g.,
as early as Huang, 1943) for emphasizing
investigator-selected anecdotes and exam-
ples that do not reflect modal child re-
sponses. Recent research by Karniol (1980)
on "immanent justice" responses by children
has indicated that when probing and care-
fully standardized interview methods are
combined with detailed reporting of results,
the kinds of developmental trends reported
by Piaget may not be found.
Questions of whether reliable develop-
mental change occurs in illusory contingency
are reinforced by non-Piagetian evidence on
adults' interpretations of random events.
One line of evidence (reviewed by Lerner,
1977) concerns the "justice motive." Find-
ings in this area indicate that even adults
show a tendency—perhaps motivationally
based rather than cognitively based—to per-
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ceive noncontingent favorable and unfavor-
able outcomes as conseqences of good and
bad behavior, respectively. Other research
(e.g., Langer, 1975; Wort-man, 1975) ex-
amined adults' beliefs about chance out-
comes independent of considerations of mo*
rality and justice. This research, too, points
to a persistent belief that chance events are
contingent on such human attributes as Skill.
Both lines of adult research suggest that
people in the period of formal operations,
like young children, may inappropriately
generalize "norms of deservingness" (Ler-
ner, 1977) and skill (Langer, 1975) to
chance situations.
The material reviewed above leaves some
uncertainty about the nature, or even the
existence, of reliable developmental change.
Three lines of Piagetian literature point to
developmental declines in various forms of
illusory contingency. Two lines of non-Piage-
tian adult research, however, indicate that
illusory contingency in moral and achieve-
ment contexts persists into adulthood. At
least one carefully executed study of children
reports no significant developmental differ-
ences in perceived contingency in its im-
manent justice form. Confusion has been
fostered by Piaget's use of relatively uncon-
trolled research methods and by the fact that
the various lines of evidence reviewed above
focused on different forms of illusory con-
tingency. One means of resolving some of
the confusion may be to focus on one form
of illusory contingency at a time using meth-
ods that are more controlled than those used
by Piaget.
In a step in this direction, Weisz (1980)
studied children's judgments about noncon-
tingent outcomes in a game designed to ap-
pear totally controlled by chance. Kinder-
garten and fourth-grade youngsters drew
cards blindly from a shuffled deck, and the
color of the cards drawn determined win-
nings. After several trials, the children were
asked to predict the winnings of other play-
ers who differed from one another in age,
intelligence, effort, and previous practice
with the task—all factors that would affect
only contingent outcomes. In general, mis-
taken perceptions of contingency—inferred
from predictions that differed as a function
of age and the other competence-related fac-
tors-—Wefe significantly more pronounced in
younger than in older children. Even most
older children, however, predicted small dif-
ferences as a function of these factors. Thus,
although most older children, unlike their
younger schoolmates, explicitly identified
the task as one controlled by luck or caprice,
they nonetheless failed to fully appreciate
the noncontingency that such an identify
cation logically implied.
The Weisz (1980) study was limited in its
implications, however, because it relied on
a single laboratory task designed specifically
to make the chance-controlled nature of its
outcomes clear to the children. Many nat-
urally occurring noncontingent outcomes in
real life are not so designed and may well
evoke quite different reactions from chil-
dren. Whether or not the support for Piaget's
developmental prediction produced by Weisz
is limited to such specially simplified labo-
ratory tasks remains unclear. Developmental
patterns that emerge from such contrived
circumstances can be credited with greater
transcontextual validity if they can also be
demonstrated in naturally occurring settings
(see Weisz, 1978). For this reason, the set-
ting for the present study was the North
Carolina State Fair. Children were inter-
viewed following voluntary participation in
four different midway activities, each of
which was a task totally controlled by chance.
Because the sample of 52 included 11
youngsters aged 12, 13, and 14, it was pos-
sible to explore whether illusory contingency
extends into age levels associated with for-
mal operational thought. Because the chance
tasks yielded naturally occurring successes
arid failures (in the children's efforts to win
desired prizes), it was also possible to probe
for evidence of self-serving bias. Weisz
(1980), building on research with adults
(e.g., Wortman, Costanzo, & Witt, 1973),
found modest evidence of such bias. Chil-
dren who received high and low winnings,
respectively, differed marginally in direc-
tions consistent With the preservation of self-
esteem. The evidence was limited, but it
might have been so because it was derived
from experiences of incomplete failure and
success (i.e., the children won either once or
four times out of five tries). The fair activ-
ities, by contrast, led to more clear-cut and
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extreme outcomes (children either won or
failed to win desired prizes) and may thus
provide a more powerful test of self-serving
bias in children.1
Method
Among the booths along the fair midway were four
that featured totally chance activities: an electronic
horse race on which participants placed bets, a pond
from which participants pulled plastic ducks with prize
information painted underneath, a giant dice throw with
months and holidays on the die faces, and a giant dice
throw with various colors on the die faces. Four male-
female pairs of university students spent evenings cir-
culating from one chance booth to another (each pair
at a different booth) on a randomly predetermined
schedule. As soon as a family (at least one parent and
one child) arrived and the child tried the chance activity,
the experimenters approached, identified, themselves as
students conducting a survey of "people's experiences
at the fair," and asked to interview the participating
child and one parent (out of earshot of each other).
When the interview was completed, the students re-
turned to their observation point and approached the
next family whose child tried the activity.
The children were asked whether they had won the
prize they wanted or not. Then they were asked, "Why
do you think it turned out that way? What caused you
to win [not to win] the prize you wanted?" and "How
good are you at [name of chance activity] compared to
most other kids your age?" Then, to give the child prac-
tice at predicting future performance, an interviewer
held up five fingers and said, "Suppose you were to try
[the chance activity] five times. How many times do you
think you would win the prize you want?" Using the
same procedure, the child was asked to predict the win-
nings (out of five tries) of (a) a first grader and a tenth
grader, (b) a "smart kid" and a "kid who was not very
smart," (c) one who "tried really hard and really con-
centrated" and one who "hardly tried at all and didn't
even pay much attention to the game," and (d) one who
"got to practice all she or he wanted" and one who "did
not get to practice at all." The questions on variations
in grade, intelligence, effort, and practice were randomly
ordered for each child.
Of the 71 families approached, 65 agreed to partic-
ipate, but 4 terminated before the interview was com-
pleted. In an effort to select only children who under-
stood the questions and attended carefully to the
interview, we set fairly strict standards for acceptability
of data from the remaining interviews. Data were ex-
cluded for children who (a) indicated that they did not
understand a question, (b) demonstrated a lack of un-
derstanding by predicting more than five wins on any
question, (c) failed to answer any of the paired predic-
tion questions, or (d) received help from a parent. Of
the 61 completed interviews, 52 met all of the criteria
for inclusion. One of these was randomly dropped from
the appropriate cell to form a 2 (Age, i.e., 6-10 vs.
11-14) X 2 (Outcome, i.e., won desired prize vs. did not
win) design with proportional cell sample sizes. Of the
30 younger children, 10 (mean age 8 years 8 months)
had won the desired prize, and 20 (mean age 8 years
8 months) had not. Of the 21 older children, 7 (mean
age 12 years 1 month) had won and 14 (mean age 11
years 5 months) had not. Thus age level and outcome
were orthogonal factors in the design (point biserial r
between age and outcome = .08).
Results
Preliminary analyses of variance on the
dependent variables described below in-
cluded sex as a factor, but over all of these
analyses there were no sex main effects and
only two dissimilar interactions involving
sex. Thus sex was not included in the anal-
yses reported below. Preliminary analyses
comparing children matched for age group
and outcome (i.e., win vs. lose) but differing
as to which student interviewed them re-
vealed no interviewer effects, so data were
collapsed across interviewers.
Unstructured Questions
Children's answers to the question about
what caused them to win or not to win were
classified as either perceived contingency
(e.g., "I'm not that good at the games be-
cause I don't play them much"), perceived
noncontingency (e.g., "Just luck"), or not
codable (e.g., "I don't know"). Using this
scheme, two independent coders showed 96%
agreement. Uncodable responses were about
twice as common among younger children
as among older ones, so the results with this
measure should be interpreted cautiously. A
Fisher exact probability test revealed no sig-
nificant effect of outcome. The age differ-
ences, however, were striking, with 8 of 11
younger children showing perceived contin-
gency (the three who gave noncontingency
answers were all 9 or older) but 14 of 17
older children showing perceived noncontin-
gency, X
2(l) = 7.71, p < .01.
Analyses of the "How good are you com-
1 In the research with adults, a common finding has
been that people tend to make self-attributions for fa-
vorable outcomes but external attributions for unfavor-
able outcomes. (For conflicting views on the consistency
and interpretation of the findings, see Bradley, 1978;
Miller & Ross, 1975). Most of this research has involved
subjects' judgments about personal outcomes. The pres-
ent focus on contingency independent of personal com-
petence (see first paragraph of this article) required that
winning and losing children make judgments concerning
the performance of others.
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Table 1
Predicted Winnings on Children's Paired Prediction Questions






























































pared to most other kids?" question focused
on whether children indicated they were the
same as "other kids" (perceived noncontin-
gency), better, or worse (both perceived con-
tingency). There were marginal effects of
outcome, x2(2) = 4.89, p < .10, primarily
because of the fact that only 13% of the chil-
dren who won the desired prize claimed to
be "worse," whereas 46% of the children
who did not win said they were worse. The
two age groups did not differ significantly;
only a minority of both younger (30%) and
older (39%) children answered correctly that




Age group effects. The four structured
paired prediction questions were analyzed by
means of four separate 2 (Age) X 2 (Out-
come) X 2 (Trial) repeated measures anal-
yses of variance (ANOVAS). The trial factors
in the four analyses were grade (i.e., Grade
10 = Trial 1, Grade 1 = Trial 2), intelli-
gence, effort, and practice, respectively. All
four ANOVAS revealed a significant trial main
effect, indicating that children who were
older, who were smarter, who tried harder,
or who had practiced, were expected to win
more than were their respective younger, less
intelligent, less diligent, and less practiced
counterparts, all four Fs(l, 47) > 10.00, all
ps < .01. In addition, all four ANOVAS showed
a significant Age X Trial interaction, indi-
cating that the predicted superiority of tenth
grade, smarter, more diligent, and more
practiced children was more pronounced
among younger than among older chil-
dren (see Table 1), all four Fs(l, 47) > 4.0,
allps < .05. Tukey's honestly significant dif-
ference (HSD) tests on the four pairs of
questions revealed that younger children
predicted significantly different outcomes as
a function of grade level (p < .01), intelli-
gence (p = .05), effort (p < .01), and prac-
tice (p < .01) but that none of these four
differences was significant for older children.
Table 1 also reveals that the four Age X
Trial interactions were actually shaped al-
most entirely by age differences in predic-
tions for the higher levels of the four char-
acteristics—that is, Grade 10, intelligence,
effort, and practice. In each of these four
conditions, younger subjects predicted higher
winnings than did older subjects (HSD p
values all < .05). At the lower levels—that
is, Grade 1, not smart, does not try, and
unpracticed—the younger and older groups
made very similar predictions, and no age
group differences approached significance.
The role of outcome. Over the four
2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAS, only one, the analysis of
the try versus no-try predictions, yielded a
significant Trial X Outcome interaction, F(l,
47) = 10.34, p < .01. Tukey's HSD test re-
vealed that the try/not-try difference among
children who had won the prize they wanted
(mean difference = 2.45) was significant
(p < .01) but that the difference among chil-
dren who had failed to win (mean differ-
ence = .77) was not. Thus winning children
saw effort as more influential in determining
outcomes than did losing children.2
2 A curious aspect of the paired prediction data ne-
cessitated an additional set of analyses. A small minority
of subjects occasionally predicted higher winnings for
first than for tenth graders, for not very smart than for
very smart children, and so on. Because these anomalous
predictions occurred somewhat (albeit nonsignificantly)
more often in older than in younger subjects, they were
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, , Significance test
X2(l) ~ 4 09*
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Note. The "Same" column shows the number of children who predicted that performance outcomes would be
identical fora 1st and for a 10th grader, for a smart and for a not smart child, and so on. The "Different" column
shows the number of children who predicted different outcomes for a 1st and for a 10th grader, and so forth!
* P < .05, . ' . - • ' . .
Paired Prediction Questions—Incidence of
Perceived Effects
The preceding analyses of age differences
give the impression that older children had
a relatively clear perception of the noncon-
tingent nature of the state fair activities.
Another perspective on the data, however,
indicates that even the older children failed
to fully appreciate the uncontrollability of
their performance outcomes, A fully accu-
rate grasp of noncontingency would lead one
to predict precisely equal winnings for a
tenth and a first grader, a practiced and an
unpracticed child, and so on. The. majority
of the older children, like most of the
younger ones, were unwilling to carry their
belief in noncontingency that far! Older chil-
dren were more likely to predict equal win-
nings than were younger ones, but as Table
more likely to have deflated 'mean difference scores for
the older group. To check against the possibility that
this phenomenon might account for the age differences
reported above, ANOVAS were recomputed, with anom-
alous predictions coded as blanks. In the 2 (Age) X 2
(Outcome) X 2 (Trial) ANOVAS on each of the four pairs
of predictions, previously significant Age X Trial inter-
actions remained significant for the questions .about in-
telligence (p < .05), effort (p < .05), and' practice
(p = .05), and fell to a marginal level (p = .06) on the
questions about grade level. Also, the previously signif-
icant outcome effect on the predicted impact of effort
remained significant (p < .05). Thus previous effects
lost in magnitude, but all remained either significant or
marginally significant.
2 shows, the age effect was significant for
only one of the four paired predictions.
Would children who have attained formal
operations recognize that the paired predic-
tions should all be the same? To answer this
question, protocols for all children aged 12
and above were examined separately. Of
these 11 children, only 3 predicted equal
winnings on all four paired questions, so ev-
idently the advent of early formal operations
does not ensure an accurate concept of non-
contingency.
Does the recognition that outcomes are
controlled by luck ensure recognition that
the outcomes do not vary with competence-
related factors (age, intelligence, etc.)? Ap-
parently not. Of the 16 children who explic-
itly described their performance as due to
luck, only 5 proceeded to predict precisely
equal winnings in each paired prediction
question. Of the remaining 11,1 child made
the perceived contingency error on one paired
prediction, 3 made the error three times* aftd
7 made the error all four times. Some of
these children's answers suggested an effort
(at that point unsuccessful) to come to grips
with the noncontingent nature of luck. For
example, one child predicted no wins for the
"not very smart" child but predicted one win
for the "smart" child "if lucky." .Another
child who predicted five wins for the child
with practice, predicted two wins for the
child who had no practice but then added
"and that by luck only,"
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Task effects. The preceding analyses did
not include task (i.e., horse race, colored
dice, etc.) as a factor because all the tasks
were totally controlled by chance, and thus
all paired predictions should have been equal
regardless of task. One might reasonably
ask, however, whether the four tasks differed
in their power to evoke the illusion of con-
tingency. To explore this question, we con-
ducted four single-classification analyses of
covariance, with task as the independent
variable and child's age and outcome as co-
variates. The four dependent variables were
the predicted difference between a tenth-
and a first-grade, "smart" and "not very
smart" child, and so on. In none of these
analyses were task differences significant
(allps > .14).
Discussion
How does illusory contingency change
with development? The present findings sug-
gest that two kinds of changes occur as chil-
dren mature from early elementary age lev-
els to early adolescence. First, as children
develop, they are less likely to explain their
own noncontingeni performance in ways
that imply controllability and are more likely
to attribute such performance to "luck" and
other uncontrollable factors. In the present
study and in Weisz (1980), virtually no early
elementary school age children attributed
the chance outcomes of their performance
to uncontrollable factors, but a majority of
older children did so. A second change that
seems to occur with development is that chil-
dren show markedly reduced expectations
regarding the impact of competence-related
factors on noncontingent events. Younger
children (like those in Weisz, 1980) pre-
dicted significantly different levels of success
for actors differing in age, intelligence, ef-
fort, and practice, whereas older children did
not.3 The findings across four tasks in a nat-
ural setting are consistent with the Piagetian
view that young children perceive noncon-
tingent events as covarying with people's
behavior and that only with development
does such illusory contingency begin to dis-
sipate.
In addition to this evidence on the direc-
tion of development, the findings suggest a
hypothesis regarding the nature of devel-
opmental change. For low levels of the four
personal attributes (i.e., first grade, not
smart, etc.) the two age groups sampled
showed low-outcome expectancies that were
similar in magnitude. It was only when high
levels of the personal attributes were speci-
fied (i.e., tenth grade, smart, etc.) that the
two age groups diverged significantly. This
suggests the possibility that children across
a broad range of developmental levels as-
sume that there are certain baselines for
chance outcomes under conditions of low
skill and effort—that is, that no matter how
low in intelligence, effort, and so on, people
may sink, they are still expected to win at
least certain minimal amounts. According
to this reasoning, the impact of developmen-
tal change would be felt primarily in judg-
ments about children not covered by the
baseline assumption—that is, children above
minimal levels of intelligence, effort, and so
on. An intriguing, though speculative, pos-
sibility for future consideration is that this
"baseline assumption" is actually an incip-
ient chance concept.
Despite the developmental gains in so-
phistication that the findings reveal, the ev-
idence indicates that even older children and
adolescents, like many of the adults in the
research of Langer (e.g., 1975) and of Wort-
man (1975), are susceptible to a subtle form
of illusory contingency—that is, the belief
that factors related to skill outcomes (e.g.,
factors such as grade level and effort) may
not be totally irrelevant to noncontingent
outcomes but may instead be associated with
slight outcome differences. Even children
who correctly identified the outcomes as
caused by "luck" fell prey to this form of
3 Younger and older groups in the present study were
older than the corresponding younger and older groups
in the study by Weisz (1980); yet the only sign of more
advanced awareness of noncontingency in the present
sample was that older children at the state fair (unlike
the fourth graders of Weisz) did not predict significantly
higher winnings for children who tried hard than for
those who did not. The absence of markedly more ad-
vanced concepts in the state fair sample may reflect the
power of the fair atmosphere and activities to induce an
illusion of contingency (see the research on adults by
Lerner [1977] and by Langer [1975] cited later in this
section) and/or the staying power of the illusion across
developmental levels (see Weisz & Stipek, in press).
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the illusion. A significant implication of this
finding for attribution theorists (e.g., Wei-
ner, 1979) who construe "luck" as an un-
controllable cause may be that children often
do not so construe "luck"!
The persistence of illusory contingency
among the oldest, presumably formal oper-
ational subjects might be seen as contra-
dicting Piagetian views on development. The
Piagetian literature reviewed in the intro-
duction does depict the formal operational
youngster as capable of recognizing the non-
contingency of chance outcomes. Neverthe-
less, it should also be noted that Piaget's the-
ories often emphasize intellectual capacity
or competence independent of performance.
It is possible that the older subjects in the
present sample had actually developed the
cognitive apparatus necessary for identifi-
cation of noncontingency but that some non-
cognitive factor(s) prevented the expression
of their intellectual capacity. Evidence re-
viewed by Lerner (1977) suggests that one
such factor may be motivation for justice.
It does seem only fair, for example, that chil-
dren who try hard should win more than
children who do not. Another factor is sug-
gested by Langer's (1975) research with
adults. Habits formed in relating skill out-
comes to human attributes can evidently be
activated almost reflexively when people rea-
son about chance events for which skill cues
are present. Such cues (e.g., competition and
active involvement) were abundant in the
state fair booths observed here. Thus per-
haps the cognitive capacity to identify non-
contingency is in place by the period of for-
mal operations, but factors such as those
identified by Lerner and Langer continue to
interfere with the expression of this capacity.
Tasks that activate such factors (e.g., by
posing issues of justice or by making skill
cues salient) may provoke illusory contin-
gency that is powerful enough to either by-
pass or overrule logical analysis.
In the only evidence of self-serving bias,
children who had won saw outcomes as
strongly affected by effort, whereas children
who had lost did not. In Weisz (1980), such
evidence of self-serving bias as could be
found was largely confined to young chil-
dren, but here the evidence cut across age
levels. The strength of the present findings
may be due in part to the fact that the state
fair activities, to a greater extent than the
laboratory task used earlier, entailed com-
petition, choice, and personal involvement—
all factors that have been shown to foster
illusory contingency in adults (Langer, 1975).
Whatever the reason for the present find-
ings, they suggest that in addition to age-
related intellectual limitations, a bias toward
self-aggrandizement may also lead to mis-
taken perceptions of contingency in children.
Efforts to understand the origins of illu-
sory contingency may contribute signifi-
cantly to our understanding of children's
behavior in many areas, including moral rea-
soning and affective responses to life events.
In the moral domain, the young child's no-
tion of "immanent justice," discussed above,
is essentially the view that "bad" outcomes,
even those that actually occur by chance, are
consequences of bad behavior. This phenom-
enon seems akin to "blaming the victim"
(see Lerner, 1970)—another manifestation
of perceived contingency between the out-
comes that people experience and the be-
havior that precedes the outcomes. A related
phenomenon often noted by clinicians is the
self-blame that young children engage in
when contemplating such adverse life events
as the death of a parent (cf. Lifton, 1967)
or divorce (Gardner, 1976). In both in-
stances, a central aspect of the self-blame
is often that the adverse event was somehow
contingent on the child's behavior.
These examples illustrate a fact not often
emphasized in the psychological literature
on control—that perceiving events as con-
trollable, as contingent on people's behavior,
is not always to the individual's benefit. An
exaggerated perception of contingency may
be quite harmful. The present evidence in-
dicates that such a perception is particularly
pronounced in young children. Further ef-
forts to understand this may add to our un-
derstanding of developmental change in phe-
nomena ranging from moral judgments to
depressive reactions.
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